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Abstract 
 
In recent years stock exchanges have been increasingly diversifying their operations 
into related business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading services and 
software sales. This trend can be observed most notably among profit-oriented 
trading venues. While the pursuit for diversification is likely to be driven by the 
attractiveness of these investment opportunities, it is yet an open question whether 
certain integration activities are also efficient, both from a social welfare and from 
the exchanges' perspective. Academic contributions so far analyzed different business 
models primarily from the social welfare perspective, whereas there is only little 
literature considering their impact on the exchange itself. By employing a panel data 
set of 28 stock exchanges for the years 1999-2003 we seek to shed light on this topic 
by comparing the factor productivity of exchanges with different business models. 
Our findings suggest three conclusions: (1) Integration activity comes at the cost of 
increased operational complexity which in some cases outweigh the potential 
synergies between related activities and therefore leads to technical inefficiencies and 
lower productivity growth. (2) We find no evidence that vertical integration is more 
efficient and productive than other business models. This finding could contribute to 
the ongoing discussion about the merits of vertical integration from a social welfare 
perspective. (3) The existence of a strong in-house IT-competence seems to be 
beneficial to overcome lower productivity growth associated with complex business 
models. 
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 1Introduction
Inrecentyearsstockexchangeshaveincreasinglydiversi¯edtheiroperationsinto
relatedbusinessareassuchasderivativestrading,post-tradingservicesandsoftware
sales.Consideringtheworld's50largeststockexchangesaccordingtotheWorld
FederationofStockExchanges(FIBV),¯gure1displaysthenumberofthoseex-
changesthathaveprovidedrelatedactivitiesbesidestheirtraditionalcashmarket
operationsfortheyears1999to2003.1Thenumberofexchangesthataddedpost-
tradingservicestotheirbusinessportfoliorosefrom22to30,whilethenumberof
venuesthatoperateaderivativestradingplatformmarkedupfrom25to31.De-
spitethestrongestrelativeincrease,providersofsoftwaresolutionsremainedrather
scarce,withthreeexchangeso®eringthisservicein1999andsevenin2003.
Figure1:RelatedActivitiesbyExchanges1999-2003
IntegrationactivityandgovernanceInterestingly,thegreatmajorityofex-
changesthatcontributedtothisrisewereorganizedaspro¯t-orientedtrading
venues.Tobespeci¯c,stockexchangesthatdiversi¯edintopost-tradingorsoftware
salesactivitieswereexclusivelypro¯t-oriented,whilethesamegroupaccountedfor
halfoftheincreaseinderivativestradingduringtheconsideredtimespan.2There
areatleasttworeasonswhypredominantlypro¯t-orientedexchangesarepursuing
theintegrationofrelatedactivities:First,theseareaspossessedastrongergrowth
potentialthanthetraditionalcashmarket,anaspectwhichisparticularlyrelevant
1Weconsideredanexchangetobeengagedinderivativestrading,post-tradingorsoftwaresales
ifitindicatedthederivedsegmentrevenuesinits¯nancialstatements.
2Inparticular,theexchangesthataddedpost-tradingtotheirbusinessduring1999and2003
wereHellenicExchange,Copenhagen,DeutscheBÄorse,ItalianExchange,OMHEX,Vienna,Na-
tionalStockExchangeIndia,andPhilippine.DerivativestradingwasintroducedbyBermuda,
Amex,Lima,HellenicExchanges,Istanbul,Johannesburg,andLondonStockExchange.Oneex-
change,namelytheTorontoStockExchange,ceasedtooperateaderivativesplatform.Therefore,
thenetincreaseinintegratedderivativesplatformsissix.Asoftwaresalesdivisionwasestablished
bySingapore,TorontoandTokyo.
1for exchanges that strive for pro¯t-maximization and hence is relatively unimportant
for non-pro¯t entities such as mutual exchanges. Second, demutualized exchanges
also have presumably more leeway to pursue attractive business opportunities due
to their di®ering control structure: Traditional mutual exchanges are usually owned
and dominated by their customers3 which not only seek to maximize the value of
their share in the venue, but also take into account their own business interest as
customers of the exchange. Therefore, as they ultimately control the activities of the
exchange they can e.g. prevent investment decisions that would increase the value
of the trading franchise but at the same time threaten their own business interests.4
In contrast, pro¯t-oriented exchanges are mostly demutualized and some of them
are even publicly listed. In these ¯rms the in°uence of their customers on invest-
ment decisions is usually not as strong. This is particularly the case for publicly
listed exchanges, which are mostly dominated by outside owners that merely have
a ¯nancial interest in the entity.5 Therefore, as the vested interests of customer-
owners are replaced by the outside-owners' common goal of maximizing the value of
their company, an exchange's management can more freely pursue value-enhancing
projects such as diversifying into related business ¯elds.
Figure 2: Related Activities by Governance Type 1999-2003
To demonstrate how integration activity varies among di®erent governance struc-
tures, we present the two graphs in ¯gure 2. The graph on the left side groups the ex-
changes according to their governance type (mutual, demutualized, publicly listed)
and displays the ¯ve-year average portion that is diversi¯ed into the considered
activities for each group. It can be seen that diversi¯cation into related activities
is most pronounced for the group of publicly listed exchanges (light grey bars) as
3These are mainly banks and brokers that conduct their businesses on the exchange.
4A prominent example in this respect is the reluctance of some customer-owners to introduce an
electronic trading platform due to fears that this could adversely a®ect their brokerage business. In
analogous manner, this could be observable for investments in related business activities. Confer
Steil (2002) for an elaborate discussion on this matter.
5Nevertheless outsider ownership can also have the opposite e®ect on integration activity as a
recent case at the Deutsche BÄ orse demonstrates. Here, a public dispute between the management
of the Deutsche BÄ orse and one of its owners, a hedge fund called TCI, emerged over the economic
merits of a merger with the London Stock Exchange and culminated in the withdrawal of the
takeover o®er. TCI named the overly expensive bid price as the main reason for their strict
opposition against a merger.
271% of them provide post-trading services, 84% o®er a derivatives trading platform
and 50% are active in the software sales ¯eld compared to only 47%, 41% and 2%,
respectively, for the group of mutual exchanges (dark grey bars). The graph on
the right side provides a slightly di®erent perspective on the same issue. Here, the
average number of activities provided by mutuals, demutualized and publicly listed
exchanges are shown for the considered time period. Mutual exchanges have on av-
erage two business activities, i.e. one additional besides the traditional cash market
operation, whereas listed exchanges are engaged on average in approximately three
activities. Demutualized exchanges lie in between these extremes. This further
strengthens the notion that pro¯t-oriented and outsider dominated exchanges are
more actively integrating related businesses into their core operations.
In order to assess the di®erent degrees of importance of related activities for
pro¯t-oriented as opposed to non-pro¯t stock exchanges, ¯gure 3 displays the av-
erage revenue breakdowns of publicly listed and mutual ¯rms for a sample of 28
exchanges during the years 1999 and 2003.6 The revenues from derivatives trading,
post-trading services and software sales were substantial for the listed exchanges,
since they represented roughly half of their total operating revenues (left graph).
For mutual exchanges, related activities played a subordinate role and the lion share
of their revenues was generated on the traditional cash market (right graph).
Figure 3: Average Revenue Breakdown of Mutual and Listed Exchanges in Sample
Integration activity and e±ciency While diversi¯cation seems to be an at-
tractive way to boost revenue and pro¯t of an exchange, industry participants,
politicians and academics point to the possibility that some business combinations
could have detrimental e®ects on social welfare. They claim that particularly ver-
tical integration, i.e. the combination of cash trading and post-trading activities,
could lead to anti-competitive foreclosure strategies by (pro¯t-oriented) exchanges
6These exchanges are also used in the subsequent e±ciency and factor productivity analysis
and represent approximately 85% of the world's equity trading volume executed on exchanges.
The sample will be presented in more detail in section 3.1. Note that the yearly average revenue
breakdown does not comprise the same exchanges for the respective years since several exchanges
changed their governance. Hence, the average revenue breakdown of listed exchanges consists of
two exchanges in 1999, whereas the 2003-¯gure includes the average of ten stock exchanges.
3resulting in higher entry barriers for potential competitors and therefore higher
prices.7 However, there are also proponents of vertical integration claiming that the
combination of trading and post-trading activities enables the exchanges to handle
transactions faster, more safely and less costly by using straight-through-processing
applications, which would ultimately result in lower prices for customers.8 We be-
lieve that this discussion touches multiple - potentially intertwined - dimensions
that need separate analysis beforehand in order to be able to assess the overall
e®ects on welfare in a second step. In particular, we want to disentangle aspects of
(1) proper corporate governance regimes from those that are related to (2) e±cient
business models in this industry.
(1) The governance regime of the entities is certainly a highly relevant aspect
that needs to be analyzed from a social welfare perspective. Special attention
should be devoted to the impact of ownership structure and objective function of
an exchange on the price and quality of its services. While pro¯t-oriented entities
will seek to earn rents and therefore may charge prices that are above marginal costs,
these rents may also induce the necessary incentives to invest in quality-enhancing
technologies and which may not exist if non-pro¯t ¯rms provide these services.9
(2) Irrespective of the governance regime, it needs to be clari¯ed whether the
combination of certain business activities makes sense from an operational e±ciency
perspective. Generally, integration of related business ¯elds ceteris paribus raises
di±culties in managing the ¯rm e±ciently, since it adds to the complexity of ex-
isting business processes. However, certain business combinations may enable the
exchange's management to utilize inherent economies of scope between activities.
An e±ciency analysis that seeks to answer this question can be conducted in two
di®erent ways. The ¯rst approach, depicted on the left hand side of ¯gure 4, would
be to compare the relative e±ciency of exchanges that may or may not possess
related activities on top of their traditional cash market operations. If the results
indicate that diversi¯ed exchanges (e.g. ¯rms A, C or D) are more e±cient and
productive than cash market-only exchanges (e.g. ¯rm B), then this would be a
clear case to support the former business models from a social welfare perspective,
provided that an optimal governance regime can be implemented. However, if diver-
si¯ed ¯rms do not exhibit a higher operative e±ciency then a clear-cut conclusion
cannot be drawn from this method. Instead, a second approach, as shown on the
right hand side of ¯gure 4, would be necessary that compares the e±ciency of an
entity that combines certain activities under one roof with the e±ciency of multiple
¯rms providing these activities separately. Hence, the e±ciency of e.g. vertical
integration would necessitate the comparison of an exchange that combines trading
and post-trading activities (e.g. ¯rm A) with a setting where these services are
provided by three independent entities, namely an exchange, a clearing house and
7For academic contributions discussing the merits of horizontal and vertical integration in
the (European) securities transaction industry, see for example Milne (2002), KÄ oppl and Monnet
(2003), Tapking and Yang (2004), van Cayseele (2004), and Serifsoy and Weiss (2005).
8A strong advocate of vertical integration is the management of Deutsche BÄ orse. In their view,
competition among European post-trading institutions is foremost negatively a®ected by di®erent
regulatory regimes in Europe. See for example Seifert (2003) and Deutsche BÄ orse Group (2005).
9A more elaborate discussion on this issue can be found in Serifsoy and Weiss (2005).
4a settlement institution (e.g. ¯rms B, C, and D). Evidence of the superiority of
combined entities over separate entities would then lead to the conclusion that such
an integration of activities is preferable, and vice versa. As will be outlined shortly,
Figure 4: Two E±ciency Measurement Methods
we will limit our analysis to the ¯rst approach, measuring the relative e±ciency
and productivity of stock exchanges with di®erent business models. Due to missing
data on other entities providing the related activities, i.e. independent derivatives
exchanges, clearing houses or settlement providers, we are not in the position of
conducting an e±ciency analysis outlined as the second approach.
Related literature To date, there exists only a small number of studies on how
integration strategies may a®ect the operative performance of exchanges. We are
aware of two contributions which analyze the performance of exchanges and take
di®erent business models into account. The author of both papers is Schmiedel.
He analyzes stock exchange performance by employing frontier e±ciency methods
in order to derive relative e±ciency and productivity values. He uses two dif-
ferent methods. While Schmiedel (2001) employs a parametric stochastic frontier
model to evaluate the cost e±ciency of European stock exchanges, he applies a non-
parametric method in his second paper (Schmiedel (2002)).10 Schmiedel's ¯ndings
on business models are ambiguous, however. His ¯rst paper, which controls within
the regression for exchanges that possess both derivatives trading and post-trading
services, shows a positive impact of integration on cost e±ciency11, whereas his
second paper indicates that the mean of productivity gains is lower for diversi¯ed
operators12. In both papers the main aim is to apply the methodology on the stock
exchange industry in general rather than analyzing certain aspects of the industry
such as di®erent business models.
The motivation of our paper is to ¯ll this void by conducting a productivity
analysis that devotes particular attention to business models and which uses more
recent data. As in Schmiedel (2002), we will employ a non-parametric method to
10Both methodologies are widely accepted and were already used for e±ciency measurement
of ¯nancial institutions by a myriad of other papers. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide an
comprehensive survey on this topic.
11Confer Schmiedel (2001, p.22)
12Confer table 7, the 'Malmquist index'-column for "Equity only" and "Exchanges with deriva-
tives" on page 26 of Schmiedel (2002).
5calculate productivity scores, albeit using a broader set of output variables. Further-
more, we go one step further than Schmiedel by regressing the derived estimations
for productivity against a set of factors mapping the frameworks in which the re-
spective exchanges are embedded. This procedure serves to highlight whether there
is a signi¯cant impact of di®erent business models on the performance of stock
exchanges.
The papers is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used in
our paper. Section 3 presents the employed data and our results. An interpretation
as well as the robustness of our ¯ndings are also discussed here. Section 4 concludes
by summing up our ¯ndings and drawing some policy implications.
2 Methodology
This section discusses the methodology used in the paper. As outlined in section 1
the main objective of this paper is to isolate the e®ects of di®erent business models
on the factor productivity of stock exchanges. For that matter we ¯rst provide a
brief overview of how to measure total factor productivity via a non-parametric
frontier approach in section 2.1. Section 2.2 describes how the speci¯c e®ects of
further factors such as di®erent business setups can be disentangled via regression
analysis.
2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis and Malmquist-Productivity
In order to measure total factor productivity of stock exchanges we will ¯rst cal-
culate relative e±ciency scores via Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and apply
these values to determine the Malmquist-productivity index, a method that cap-
tures changes in e±ciency of ¯rms over time and which bases on similar DEA-like
linear programming techniques.
Data Envelopment Analysis DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (1978). Using their linear programming algorithm enables the calculation
of relative technical e±ciency13 values for similar entities which process multiple
inputs of resources into multiple outputs of products or services. Our analysis
will focus on technical instead of economic e±ciency as it liberates the analysis
from assuming a potentially ill-de¯ned economic objective function such as pro¯t
motivation. This is a more appropriate means to assess the relative performance
between for-pro¯t and not-for-pro¯t entities from the same industry.14 The e±-
ciency of each entity under evaluation is determined by calculating the deviation
13The terms technical and economic e±ciency were coined by Farrell (1957). In his de¯nition,
technical e±ciency is achieved when an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one
other output or an increase in at least one other input and if a reduction in at least one input
requires an increase in at least one other input or a reduction in at least one output. Economic
e±ciency, on the other hand, incorporates information on prices for the respective inputs and
outputs and an economic objective to be pursued such as cost minimization or revenue maximiza-
tion. It is achieved by implementing the cost minimizing or revenue maximizing production plan.
Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 9-18)
14Confer for example Pestieau and Tulkens (1993, p.300-301).
6each organization has from an e±cient frontier. The frontier itself is set up as a
piece-wise linear combination of best-practice observations spanning a convex pro-
duction possibilities set. The computed e±ciency value is thus a relative measure
as it quanti¯es the performance of each entity in comparison to a set of "best"-
performing peers. DEA is a non-parametric approach that has no predetermined
functional relation between inputs and outputs, i.e. there are no a priori weights
attached to these factors. Instead, the weighting of the factors that are involved
in the production process is endogenously optimized for each decision making unit
(DMU)15 individually. By doing so, the weighting factors of the inputs and outputs,
i.e. the underlying production technology, can vary substantially among the DMUs.
This allows each DMU to attain the highest possible e±ciency value subject to the
constraint that the e±ciency values of all remaining DMUs stay within the de¯ned
boundaries of the e±ciency measure when using the same weighting scheme.16 The
resulting °exibility in the production function is an advantage whenever the true
functional relationship between inputs and outputs is unknown. This is clearly the
case in the stock exchange industry so that it seems sensible to allow for di®erent
types of production functions during the analysis. Considerable uncertainty also
remains on the technological setting that is appropriate for this industry. As a con-
sequence, we will calculate e±ciency and productivity scores for both a constant
returns-to-scale (CRS) as well a variable returns-to-scale (VRS) environment.17
The Malmquist-productivity index The Malmquist productivity was intro-
duced by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). While DEA measures the relative
e±ciency of a DMU for a certain year, the Malmquist-productivity index compares
year-on-year changes in technical e±ciency. The method gained additional appeal
when FÄ are et al. re¯ned it by decomposing the productivity change into two sep-
arate e®ects, namely the change in e±ciency and technological progress. In the
following, we sketch the fundamental issues of this method.18
Consider the left panel of ¯gure 5 (CRS) where a DMU's one-input (x), one-
output (y) constant returns-to-scale production process is depicted for two subse-
quent periods t and t+1 with respective e±cient production frontiers Tt and Tt+1.
Irrespective of the observed input-output-combinations (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) the
slopes of the two best practice frontiers indicate whether technological progress has
occurred from period t to t + 1. As the slope of Tt+1 is steeper than that of Tt,
technology must have progressed, for it is possible in t + 1 to produce the same
amount of output with fewer inputs. This can readily be seen when focusing on
15The term "DMU" was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1981) and has been widely
adopted by other authors.
16This procedure ensures that a DMU's activity can be justi¯ed from an economic point of view
as it assumes that the respective decision makers act according to certain factor prices and thus
give appropriate weights to the employed inputs and produced outputs in line with the notion of
striving for maximum e±ciency.
17VRS allows for di®ering returns-to-scale characteristics for di®erent levels of input-output
combinations whereas CRS holds these combinations constant. Confer Banker, Charnes, and
Cooper (1984) for the VRS-re¯nement of the linear programm.
18Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.68-75) and Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt
(1993, p.50-53) for a more detailed discussion.
7points b and c in the ¯gure which determine the inputs that are required to produce
the same output level yt in the respective periods. Thus, using technology Tt+1 en-
ables the same output to be converted by (0b¡0c) fewer inputs. To see the change
in e±ciency, one needs to take a closer look at the actual input-output combina-
tions, i.e. (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) of the decision making unit (DMU). Apparently,
neither of the two is produced in an e±cient manner. Note, that the points b and f
represent the minimum input levels for the given output levels yt and yt+1. As the
deviation from the frontier has increased in period t+1 compared to period t, there
was a decline in e±ciency for this DMU. In total, the two factors that comprise the
productivity change of the DMU are running in opposite directions in our illustra-
tion. The right panel (VRS) depicts the case for variable returns-to-scale and can
be analyzed analogously. Here, Tt ½ Tt+1 which again implies that technological
progress must have occurred.
Figure 5: Input-oriented Malmquist approach for CRS and VRS
In order to determine the aggregate change in productivity, FÄ are et al. de¯ne
input distance functions - that are the reciprocals of Farrell's technical e±ciency
measure - with respect to the two adjacent time periods in such a way that they
measure the maximum proportional change in inputs required to make (xt+1;yt+1)
feasible in relation to technology Tt and make (xt;yt) feasible in relation to Tt+1.19
They de¯ne the productivity index as the geometric mean of two mixed period
distance functions20:
M(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
(1)
19The methodology of FÄ are et al. for the output-oriented index is adapted here for the input-
oriented approach. Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.69-70)
20The measurement of productivity in the VRS-case has to be treated with caution since the
results could be °awed as was noted by Grifell-Tatj¶ e and Lovell (1995). Additionally, FÄ are,
Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.73 FN 15) note that solutions from the mixed-period
distance functions might not be feasible.
8where the ¯rst factor uses time period t and the second factor time period t + 1 as
the respective reference technology. Equation (1) can be transformed into equation
(2) which uncovers the two decomposed e®ects stated earlier.
M(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
¢
Dt(xt;yt)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
(2)
The factor outside the square root indicates the change in e±ciency as it is equiva-
lent to the ratio of Farrell's technical e±ciency for periods t and t + 1. The factor
under the square root displays the geometric mean of shifts in technology at output
levels yt and yt+1, respectively. The calculation of the distance functions can again
be illustrated by ¯gure 5:
M(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
0d=0f
0a=0b
s
0d=0e
0d=0f
¢
0a=0b
0a=0c
(3)
Note that for both factors, a value of unity indicates no change whereas a value
above (below) unity signi¯es a positive (negative) change in technology and e±-
ciency. Note further that exchanges that possess a low DEA-e±ciency value will
possess a larger potential to improve their productivity than exchanges that are
already highly e±cient. In the extreme, an exchange that is fully e±cient in two
adjacent periods cannot improve its technical e±ciency at all. Therefore, we need
to treat comparisons between productivity gains of highly e±cient and less e±cient
exchanges with caution.21
For the m-input/s-output case, the following four DEA-like linear programs need
to be solved for all i = 1;:::;n DMUs in order to calculate the respective changes in
productivity22, keeping in mind that the required input distance functions are the
reciprocal of Farrell's input-oriented technical e±ciency measure. Thus,
[Dt(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (4)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y t
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
gives the distance function Dt
1(xt
1;yt
1) of DMU 1. Similarly, D
t+1
1 (x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) is
calculated by substituting the indices t by t+1 in equation (4). The remaining two
linear problems are mixed period calculations meaning that the reference technology
is constructed from data of period t (and t + 1, respectively), whereas the input-
output-combinations to be evaluated are from period t + 1 (and t, respectively).
Hence, they provide solutions for Dt
1(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) and D
t+1
1 (xt
1;yt
1):
21In our second stage regressions we will control for this e®ect by employing the exchanges'
e±ciency values as additional independent control variable.
22Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 180-186).
9[Dt(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 )]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (5)
s:t: µX
t+1
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y
t+1
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
and
[Dt+1(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (6)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t+1¸
Y t
1 · Y
t+1¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
2.2 Regression analysis
Section 2.1 presented our approach to calculate DEA-e±ciency and Malmquist-
productivity values. We so far assumed to employ input and output variables into
the calculation that are directly related to the operations of an exchange. Additional
factors representing the framework in which the exchanges operate, such as di®ering
business models, have so far been not included in our analysis. We will use a two-
stage process that provides a linkage between these operational and framework
factors. Stage one encompasses the aforementioned calculation of e±ciency and
productivity values and is based solely on operational inputs and outputs. In the
second stage, the resulting productivity values are used as statistical estimators for
productivity in the regression analysis23 and are regressed against the framework
variables. The variables employed will then explain the impact on overall Malmquist
productivity (MQ) as well as on the two decomposed e®ects, namely on the change
in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and on technological progress (¢TECH). This
procedure enables us to disentangle the individual e®ects of framework variables
and provides a solid basis to judge whether there are signi¯cant di®erences along
the varying business models. Hence, we obtain three regression models:
MQi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (7)
¢EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (8)
¢TECHi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (9)
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t respectively
23We also regressed against the e±ciency values employing a Tobit random e®ects regression
model. This procedure is necessary as the e±ciency values are truncated from above at a value
of one. Confer Dusansky and Wilson (1994) and McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) for a similar
approach. We present our results in table 7 of appendix D.
10Here, MQi;t, ¢EFFi;t and ¢TECHi;t represent the values of Malmquist pro-
ductivity, change in technical e±ciency and technological progress of exchange i
from period t¡1 to period t, respectively. Hereby, Xi;t = [1 x0] is a ((1£(K +1))
vector of K framework variables plus one and ¯ is an ((L + 1) £ 1) vector of para-
meters. In these regressions we will use a ¯xed e®ects model, since the Hausman
tests mostly reject the hypothesis that there is no systematic di®erence between
the ¯xed and the random e®ects estimation - as we will see in section 3.3.2.24 We
will make use of K = 11 framework variables due to be presented in section 3.2.
Additionally, we will employ the calculated DEA-e±ciency value of period t ¡ 1
(EFFt¡1) of each exchange as a further independent variable in order to control
for the fact that less e±cient exchanges can potentially improve their productivity
by a larger extent than highly e±cient exchanges.25 Since the dependent vari-
ables are calculated by comparing two adjacent periods, i.e. MQt consumes data
from periods t and t-1, we have four observations per DMU. Thus, we regress for
i = f1;:::;n = 28g £ t = f1:::(T ¡ 1) = 4g = 112 observations.26
3 Data and empirical results
3.1 The sample
The study employs a balanced panel data set that includes 28 stock exchanges for
a ¯ve year time period (1999-2003) as can be seen in table 1.
The sample encompasses ¯ve exchanges from the Americas, fourteen from Eu-
rope/Africa and nine from the Asia/Paci¯c region. All relevant accounting and
transaction data have been converted into US-dollars and adjusted for in°ation.27
Although the sample lacks completeness of the whole exchange population, it does
comprise on average 85% of the total equity trading volume on stock exchanges
reported to the World Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) by roughly 75 ex-
changes.
In order to see how representative our sample is concerning the discussed busi-
ness models, we re-present a modi¯ed version of ¯gure 1, which shows the exchanges'
related activities in our sample as a portion of the 50 largest trading venues world-
wide. The ¯lled areas of the bars represent the number of exchanges that are part
of our sample. As can be seen, we included all exchanges that provide software
services, whereas we incorporated more than half of the exchanges with derivatives
24The Hausman speci¯cation test veri¯es whether the coe±cients of a regression model with
random e®ects are unbiased compared to the coe±cients of a ¯xed e®ects model. The underly-
ing assumption is that ¯xed e®ects models always produce consistent but potentially ine±cient
estimators whereas a random e®ects model is always e±cient but can be inconsistent. Confer for
example Johnston and DiNardo (1997, p.403-404) or Greene (1993, p.479-480) for further details.
25Confer our explanation in section 2.1, formula (2) and footnote 21.
26In order to employ White-corrected estimators to control for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity
we use EViews 5 as statistical package.
27The accounting data was acquired from the annual reports of the exchanges, whereas trans-
action and other descriptive data was obtained from the databases of the FIBV, the Federation of
European Stock Exchanges (FESE), the HP Handbook of World Stock, Derivatives & Commodity
Exchanges 2001, 2002 and 2003, direct correspondence with the exchanges, company web sites and
general internet research.
11No. Exchange Region Related Activities Avg. World
Post-Trading Derivatives Software Market Share
1 BOVESPA Americas -
p
- 0.2%
2 Lima Americas - 2003- - 0.0%
3 NASDAQ Americas - - - 25.7%
4 NYSE Americas - - - 25.1%
5 Toronto TSX Americas - -1999 2002- 1.1%
6 Budapest Europe/Africa -
p
- 0.0%
7 Copenhagen Europe/Africa 2000-
p
- 0.2%
8 Deutsche BÄ orse Europe/Africa 2000-
p p
3.7%
9 Euronexty Europe/Africa
p p p
7.7%
10 Hellenic* Europe/Africa 2000- 2002- 2000- 0.2%
11 Istanbul Europe/Africa - 2001- - 0.1%
12 Johannesburg JSE Europe/Africa
p
2001- - 0.2%
13 London Europe/Africa - 2003- - 10.0%
14 Malta Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.0%
15 Oslo Europe/Africa -
p
- 0.2%
16 OM Gruppen Europe/Africa 2001-
p p
1.0%
17 SWX Zurih Europe/Africa -
p
- 1.5%
18 Vienna Europe/Africa 2000-
p
- 0.0%
19 Warsaw Europe/Africa -
p
- 0.0%
20 Australian Asia/Paci¯c
p p
- 0.7%
21 Hongkong Asia/Paci¯c
p p
- 0.7%
22 Jakarta Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.0%
23 Kuala Lumpur Asia/Paci¯c
p p
- 0.1%
24 Phillippine Asia/Paci¯c 2003- - - 0.0%
25 Singapore SGXy Asia/Paci¯c
p p
2000- 0.2%
26 Taiwan Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 1.8%
27 Thailand Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.1%
28 Tokyo Asia/Paci¯c
p p
2002- 4.8%
Total 17 20 7 85.2%
*: Athens Stock Exchange in 1999
y: Pro forma ¯gures for 1999 p
: Exchange possessed this activity since 1999 or earlier
Table 1: Sample of exchanges used in the analysis, 1999-2003
trading and about a third of the exchanges with post-trading services. Hence, par-
ticularly exchanges with post-trading facilities are underrepresented in our sample.
This is due to this group's relatively large portion of mutual exchanges - as was
observable in ¯gure 2. These exchanges are usually not obliged to comprehensively
disclose their activities to the public. Hence, we were not able to include these
exchanges in our sample due to a lack of available comprehensive information.
Figure 6: Representativeness of Sample
123.2 Variables
Table 2 provides an overview of the two di®erent sets of variables employed in
the analysis. They will be discussed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Accompanying
descriptive statistics on the variables are given in Appendix A.
FIRST STAGE: Operational Variables
Inputs
x
1
i;t Number of sta® employed at exchange i in period t (year-end ¯gures)
x
2
i;t Tangible assets at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
Outputs
y
1
i;t Number of listed companies at exchange i in period t
y
2
i;t Total trading volume in bonds and shares at exchange i in period t (in million dollars)
y
3
i;t Total number of derivatives contracts traded at exchange i in period t
y
4
i;t Post-trading services and software sales at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
SECOND STAGE: Framework Variables
Business Model
HORIZONTALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i operates a derivatives platform
in period t.
VERTICALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i provides post-trading services
in period t.
HORI ¡ VERTICALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i is both vertically
and horizontally integrated in period t.
FULL INTEGRATIONi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i is both vertically
and horizontally integrated and also provides software services in period t.
OUTSOURCINGi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i has outsourced its IT-system
in period t.
Governance
DEMUTi;t Dummy variable for demutualized exchange i in period t
LISTEDi;t Dummy variable for publicly listed exchange i in period t
Competitive Position and Attractiveness of the Capital Market
LIQUIDITYi;t Level of liquidity at exchange i in period t. Liquidity is de¯ned as the ratio of
annual trading volume in domestic equity and market capitalization of domestic ¯rms.
(year-end ¯gures, in %)
¢TRADINGi;t Relative y-o-y change in equity trading at exchange i from period t-1 to period t.
The exchange's percentage change in trading volume is deducted
by the sample median change of trading volume (year-end ¯gures, in %)
FOREIGN LISTINGi;t World market share in new listings of foreign companies at exchange i
in period t measured as the portion of new foreign listings at exchange i
compared to the total number of new foreign listings worldwide (year-end ¯gures, in %).
Financial Flexibility
¢LTFINANCEi;t Growth of equity and long term debt on exchange i's balance sheet
from period t-1 to period t. (book values, year-end ¯gures, in %)
Control Variable
¢EFFi;t¡1 Corresponding e±ciency values (CRS or VRS) of exchange i in period t-1.
Table 2: Variables used in the two-stage process
133.2.1 Operational variables
In the ¯rst stage, the Malmquist-index calculations will be based on variables that
are directly related to the operations of an exchange and can be in°uenced by the
management. An appropriate choice of variables that represent the "production
process" of an exchange is not a clear-cut task.28 When considering plausible input
variables, it seems sensible to cover both capital and labor aspects of the production
process. Thus, labor will be approximated by the number of sta® working for an
exchange i in period t (x1
i;t) whereas the utilization of capital for investments such
as the setup of an IT-infrastructure, a trading space and the necessary buildings are
subsumed by the value of tangible assets employed at exchange i in period t (x2
i;t).
On the output side, four di®erent services are considered that are 'produced' by
an exchange. The variable y1
i;t stands for the number of listed companies at exchange
i in period t. It will be used as a proxy for the exchange's e®ort to monitor the
listed ¯rms on the exchange in order to ensure fair trading and equal disclosure
practices of company-speci¯c information. Thus, the supervision of listed ¯rms can
be regarded as a service for trading participants to achieve market transparency.
Secondly, the total trading volume in equities as well as in bonds will approximate
the activities of exchange i on the cash market in period t (y2
i;t).29 As several
exchanges have diversi¯ed their businesses into related activities such as derivatives
trading and post-trading services as well as into the development and maintenance
of exchange-related software systems, it is necessary to include them in the output
set. Therefore, variable y3
i;t captures the total number of derivative contracts traded
on the forward markets. Variable y4
i;t represents the revenues from post-trading
activities and software sales at exchange i in period t. The use of revenue numbers
for the latter variable is not the most appropriate ¯gure to be included in the output
set. The number of clearing and settlement transactions serviced and the number
of software systems sold would have been better proxies. However, due to the lack
of this type of data for all exchanges in our sample, we opted for this proceeding.
Before proceeding to the next paragraph a few words should be devoted to the
choice of the proper DEA-model. Considering the applied inputs and outputs in
this paper it makes sense to use an input-oriented DEA-model since the number
of sta® and the tangible assets of an exchange can be more directly altered by the
management than the level of demand for their products and services. Thus, the
management's e®ort to reduce the exchange's inputs seems to be a fairer yardstick
than its exertion to augment the venue's output levels.
28Depending on the input and output variables incorporated in the calculation, the e±ciency
scores might have a bias towards certain DMUs. As an example, consider omitted output variables
that only some DMUs in the sample produce. If we cannot adjust the input variables of these
DMUs accordingly in such a manner that we merely include the amount of inputs devoted to the
outputs considered in the calculation the unadjusted input value will be too high. We mitigate this
problem by calculating productivity scores for the broadest possible output-set, for it is easier to
obtain information on additional outputs than to acquire a detailed breakdown of the used inputs
in order to adjust them for the omitted outputs.
29The employment of the number of transactions performed on an exchange would have been a
more precise measure of the activity. Unfortunately, this sort of data was not available for all 28
exchanges.
143.2.2 Framework variables
The second stage now considers additional determinants arising from the framework
in which an exchange is embedded and that may also have an in°uence on its
performance. As noted by Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.53-54), the variables
of the second stage may have an impact on the e±ciency with which inputs are
transformed to outputs, but they should not a®ect the production process itself.
Thus, the authors maintain the requirement that the variables of the ¯rst and
second stage are uncorrelated.30 We will consider four types of factors that deserve
particular attention and present corresponding variables that will function as proxies
in our regressions. These are (1) the exchange's business model (2) exchange's
corporate governance regime (3) the competitive environment and the attractiveness
of the exchange's home capital market and (4) the exchange's ¯nancial °exibility.
Business model As outlined in section 1, several exchanges extended their ac-
tivities to other areas besides the operation of a cash market. Some exchanges
integrated horizontally by providing an institutionalized derivatives trading venue,
others followed a vertical silo model by integrating post-trading services into the
existing operations. Yet others are engaged as software-systems providers, most
notably for other stock exchanges. As a consequence, there are several distinct
business models present in this industry which could have di®erent e®ects on the
exchanges' productivity: On the one hand, the integration of certain activities could
be bene¯cial due to potential synergies. Consider for example the combination of
a cash and a forward market, which could be operated by a single trading system,
and would therefore save (input) resources. In a similar fashion one could expect
economies of scope when combining trading and post-trading services by utilizing
a common transaction platform.31 Furthermore, it could be argued that exchanges
with a pronounced software development competence are more apt in technologi-
cally integrating di®erent activities and thus avoiding (technical) ine±ciencies when
operating them. However, there are also potential drawbacks attached to integra-
tion activity. A combination of several business lines may lead to diseconomies due
to the di±culty to e±ciently manage an increased level of complexity of business
processes. Therefore, it is di±cult to provide ex ante expectations of the productiv-
ity characteristics of certain business models. To test for any di®erences in produc-
tivity among these business setups we will employ four dummy variables covering
¯ve distinct business models. By doing so, we explicitly distinguish between cash
markets-only operators and exchanges that operate (1) both a cash and a forward
market using a dummy variable denoted as HORIZONTAL (2) a cash market and
post-trading facilities employing a variable denoted as V ERTICAL (3) a cash and
30However, for some of our variables we cannot maintain this point as can be seen in appendix C,
where table 6 displays the correlation among the employed variables. In particular the correlation
between the ¯rst stage variables x1, x2, y1, and y2 with the second stage variables FOREIGN
LISTING and LIQUIDITY is highly positive. Therefore our coe±cient estimates may possess
some bias. Nevertheless, our ¯ndings remain robust when we drop the latter variables from our
regressions as displayed in table 8.2.
31Confer Serifsoy and Weiss (2005) for a discussion on the European securities transaction
industry from an industrial organization perspective.
15a forward market as well as post-trading facilities by introducing a dummy denoted
as HORI ¡ V ERTICAL and (4) all of these activities as well as a software sales
division. Exchanges that fall under this category will receive a value of one at a
dummy variable denoted as FULL INTEGRATION.32
Some exchanges do not develop and operate their trading systems themselves
but buy this service from an external provider. Thus, such an exchange rather in-
curs additional operating costs, which primarily materialize in the pro¯t-loss state-
ment and to a much lesser extent in its sta® size and its tangible assets, which
are the considered input factors in our analysis. Therefore, ignoring the outsourc-
ing of IT-services would ceteris paribus result in a disadvantage for exchanges that
develop their own trading system by employing sta® and assets for that matter.
Consequently, we need to control for this aspect. We do so by employing a dummy
variable, denoted as OUTSOURCING, which equals one when the exchange under
consideration outsources its trading system. Since outsourcing ceteris paribus re-
duces the required input factors and hence increases the calculated e±ciency values,
we would expect a positive coe±cient sign at this variable.
Governance We consider three di®erent governance regimes, namely a (1) mutual
structure (2) a demutualized, customer-dominated structure and (3) a demutual-
ized, outsider-dominated structure. The distinction between the latter two forms is
whether the stock exchange is publicly listed. To operationalize the distinctions, we
de¯ne two dummy variables as shown in table 2. The variables can take the following
con¯gurations: (1) A mutual exchange, denoted as DEMUT = 0 ^ LISTED = 0,
i.e. neither demutualized nor listed. (2) A demutualized exchange, denoted as
DEMUT = 1 ^ LISTED = 0, i.e. demutualized but not listed. (3) A publicly
listed exchange, denoted as DEMUT = 1 ^ LISTED = 1, i.e. both demutual-
ized and listed.33 Note that the LISTED-variable will only display the additional
in°uence, i.e. on top of being demutualized, on stock exchange e±ciency and pro-
ductivity. Ex ante, we would expect that both demutualized and listed exchanges
will outperform mutuals in both e±ciency and productivity scores. Furthermore,
since some authors emphasize the importance of being publicly listed in order to
operate e±ciently34, we expect a stronger performance by outsider-dominated ex-
changes.
32Other combinations of business models such as "cash market and software" or "cash and
derivatives market and software" were omitted since the subsample size was too small to draw
inferences. As a consequence, we subsumed the Toronto Stock Exchange under "cash only"-
operator in 2002 despite their operations in software sales. In an analogous manner we assigned
the OM-Gruppen (in 1999-2000) and the Deutsche BÄ orse (in 1999) to the HORIZONTAL-variable
although both ¯rms possessed a software division in the indicated periods. Finally, we assigned
the Hellenic Exchange to the V ERTICAL-variable in 2000 and 2001 with the same reasoning. An
additional problem occurred here as we were not able to get transaction data of Hellenic's derivative
trading activity. Therefore, since their derivatives activity was not taken into account during the
¯rst stage productivity calculation, we decided to treat them in a similar way in the second stage.
Otherwise we could have assigned the exchange to the FULL INTEGRATION-variable in 2000
and 2001 as they both possessed derivatives trading and software sales activities.
33Note that the con¯guration DEMUT = 0 ^ LISTED = 1 does not exist, since all listed
exchanges underwent a demutualization process before.
34Confer for example OECD (2003).
16Competition and attractiveness of capital market A meaningful variable
that captures the exchange's competitive environment and the general attractive-
ness of its home capital market, is di±cult to ¯nd. Nevertheless, since the omittance
of competitive pressure and capital market attractiveness as an in°uencing variable
would not be satisfactory, a crude measurement is attempted. In the following we
present three variables that accentuate distinct aspects.
Our ¯rst variable, denoted as LIQUIDITY , measures the depth of the market
operated by an exchange and thereby provides a proxy for an exchange's impor-
tance and market power vis-µ a-vis other exchanges. A common way to calculate the
existing level of liquidity on an exchange's trading platform is simply to divide the
annual (equity) trading volume by the market capitalization of the ¯rms listed on
the exchange.
The second variable, denoted as ¢TRADING, proxies an exchange's perfor-
mance capturing year-on-year changes in the competitive position. To operational-
ize, we employ year-on-year (y-o-y) changes in equity trading volume at an ex-
change. In order to control for broader market movements we deduct the median
y-o-y change of the whole sample from each exchange's performance in the respec-
tive period. The rationale behind this procedure is the following: A relative gain
in trading volume, i.e. the exchange was able to capture more trading volume than
the median exchange of the sample, signals a relatively strong competitive position
as opposed to other exchanges. By contrast, a relative loss in trading volume would
suggest a deterioration in the competitive position.
Our third variable, denoted as FOREIGN LISTING captures the general
attractiveness of the exchange's home capital market by calculating an exchange's
market share in new foreign ¯rms listings as a percentage of the total new foreign
listings worldwide. We believe that this describes the general attractiveness of a
capital market quite well since there are mainly two reason for such a behavior by
a foreign ¯rm: Either the ¯rm is forced to list abroad for its home capital market
is not attractive or it lists itself additionally on foreign exchanges in order to seek
capital from these markets that presumably possess a large and thus attractive pool
of potential investors.35
When we regress these variables against the technical e±ciency and productivity
of an exchange, it is di±cult to establish an ex ante expectation concerning the the-
oretically correct sign of the regression coe±cients. Both directions seem plausible.
Consider for example the LIQUIDITY -variable: An exchange with a relatively
deep market can be considered to be in a strong competitive position which may
result in a better exploitation of its resources and thus in higher e±ciency. The
contrary may also hold as monopolistic inertia symptoms could cause excessive (in-
put) spending and contribute to lower e±ciency values. We would argue that both
directions of the coe±cient's sign of the FOREIGN LISTING-variable can be ex-
plained in a similar fashion. The ¢TRADING-variable may also display di®ering
35Support for this notion can be found in an empirical paper on cross-listings by Pagano, Randl,
RÄ oell, and Zechner (2001) who ¯nd that ¯rms seeking cross-listing tend to choose foreign capital
markets with large and liquid markets as well as where investor protection and e±ciency of courts
are high.
17signs: It could have a positive sign when the relative loss in trading volume causes
a decrease in e±ciency. This will be the case when unfavorable market conditions
coincide with lower absolute equity trading volumes, since this will negatively a®ect
the level of the DEA-output variable y2
i;t and thus ceteris paribus a decrease of the
e±ciency value. Yet, the sign could also be negative when a relative loss in trad-
ing volume means that the exchange overcompensates this by a disproportionate
reduction in the input variables and thereby achieves higher e±ciency values. By
the same token a DMU could spend overly much in its inputs than the increase in
trading volume would allow to do so.
Financial °exibility In reality we observe that several exchanges raised external
funds in order to ¯nance the modernization of their trading venues or to pursue
other projects that were aimed to boost their competitiveness.36 Thus, the ¯nan-
cial °exibility of an exchange, i.e. its ability to raise new funds to ¯nance future
investments may also have an e®ect on an exchange's e±ciency and productivity,
albeit it remains ex ante unclear whether it will be a positive or an adverse one.
On the one hand, it could lead to ine±ciencies due to overinvestments resulting
from (too) abundant funds. On the other, the capability of acquiring new proceeds
could be a necessary prerequisite to induce e±ciency-enhancing investments. We
employ a variable which seeks to capture the exchange's in°ow of new proceeds in
long term capital in a certain period. Ideally, we would measure this by looking
at the respective cash °ow statements of each exchange in order to capture the
actual capital in°ow. However, these ¯gures are not available for all exchanges.
Hence, we are forced to use a less accurate means and employ a variable denoted as
¢LTFINANCE, which denotes the year-on-year change in equity and long-term
debt as is stated in the exchanges' balance sheets.37
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Results from the ¯rst stage
In Appendix B, table 5 presents the ¯rst-stage results of the DEA-e±ciency and
Malmquist-productivity analysis for both constant and variable returns-to-scale.38
The results of the e±ciency scores indicate that four exchanges, namely Copen-
hagen, Deutsche BÄ orse, Euronext and Malta, are fully e±cient in all ¯ve consid-
ered periods in the VRS-case, whereas there are only two such cases in the CRS-
environment (Copenhagen and Euronext). Both underlying technologies display
an overall increase in mean productivity except for the 2001/2002-period where we
calculated an overall stagnation in productivity. The most remarkable increase is
36Most explicitly this has occurred at exchanges that went public but one can imagine that -
irrespective of the governance - fresh capital was provided for the exchanges to better cope with
increased competitive pressure.
37In order to prevent distortions from currency °uctuations we use in°ation-adjusted book values
of the exchanges' home currencies.
38We are grateful to Holger Scheel whose program 'EMS' we utilized for the calculation of the
e±ciency and productivity scores.
18accomplished by the Brazilian exchange BOVESPA, which improved its productiv-
ity by an annual arithmetic average of 29% to 34% for the respective settings.
3.3.2 Results from the second stage
Table 3 displays the results from the regression analysis using the ¯rst stage results
as dependent variables as was outlined in section 2.2.
Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL -0.199 -0.321*** 0.132** -0.098 -0.206*** 0.098
Std. Err. 0.143 0.127 0.061 0.129 0.040 0.103
VERTICAL -0.447*** -0.507*** 0.072 -0.457*** -0.348*** -0.101
Std. Err. 0.096 0.112 0.076 0.114 0.125 0.083
HORI-VERTICAL -0.331*** -0.381*** 0.065 -0.243*** -0.222*** -0.043
Std. Err. 0.097 0.071 0.109 0.064 0.021 0.085
FULL INTEGRATION -0.164* -0.300*** 0.115* -0.058 -0.194 0.092
Std. Err. 0.092 0.056 0.065 0.090 0.153 0.186
OUTSOURCING -0.239*** -0.427*** 0.213*** -0.290** -0.399*** 0.155**
Std. Err. 0.075 0.065 0.055 0.145 0.099 0.072
DEMUT -0.007 -0.190*** 0.210** -0.093** -0.124** 0.035***
Std. Err. 0.042 0.053 0.094 0.046 0.054 0.006
LISTED 0.011 -0.055 0:051y 0.064 -0.041 0:115y
Std. Err. 0.133 0.106 0.032 0.137 0.122 0.075
LIQUIDITY -0.017 0.011 -0.041 -0.012 0.065 -0.057
Std. Err. 0.020 0.028 0.034 0.039 0.061 0.094
¢TRADING 0.019 -0.036 0.067 0:046y 0.003 0.066
Std. Err. 0.032 0.026 0.054 0.028 0.071 0.079
FOREIGN LISTING 0.649 -0.810 1.641* -0.468 -0.247 -0.285
Std. Err. 0.678 0.990 0.960 0.786 0.504 1.073
¢LT FINANCE -0.060 0.015 -0.084*** -0.047 0.060 ¡0:117y
Std. Err. 0.072 0.080 0.033 0.081 0.068 0.080
EFF -0.993*** -0.917*** -0.085 -0.531** -0.984*** 0.379**
Std. Err. 0.307 0.349 0.137 0.224 0.325 0.166
CONST 1.958*** 2.079*** 0.894*** 1.721*** 2.030*** 0.757***
Std. Err. 0.174 0.149 0.031 0.128 0.220 0.136
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112
R2(adj:) 0.329 0.413 0.064 0.304 0.375 -0.070
Hausman Test (p) 0.0004 0.0001 0.0778 0.0024 0.0000 0.4287
Table 3: Results from the second-stage regression analysis
The table presents the results of White-corrected regressions against Malmquist-
productivity (MQ), change in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and progress in technol-
ogy (¢TECH). The table is divided into two panels. The left panel displays the
results for constant returns-to-scale. The right panel provides our estimations when
assuming variable returns-to-scale. We indicated the coe±cients' levels of signi¯-
cance by the symbols y, ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤, representing 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% signi¯cance
levels, respectively. Additionally, we numerated the columns (2-7) for convenience.
Overall, the adjusted R2-values of the productivity regressions are reasonable, save
for the less appealing values in columns four and seven. When comparing the in-
dividual coe±cients between the two panels we ¯nd that their signs, if they are
signi¯cant, do not change. The results of the Hausman test demonstrate that a
random e®ects model is likely to produce inconsistent estimates for our regressions
in all but one case (column seven), since the p-values display a signi¯cant rejection
of the null-hypothesis. Thus, the use of a ¯xed e®ects model is more appropriate.
19In°uence of governance We ¯nd no signi¯cant evidence that demutualized ex-
changes have a higher productivity than mutual exchanges in the CRS-case whereas
in the VRS-case they perform even signi¯cantly worse compared to mutuals. The
source of the underperformance is explained in both technology settings by a signif-
icantly negative value in changes of technical e±ciency (¢EFF) as can be seen in
columns three and six indicating that mutual exchanges were more able to improve
their technical e±ciency. However, the demutualized exchanges' progress in tech-
nology (¢TECH), the second component of productivity, is signi¯cantly higher
than at mutual exchanges (columns four and seven). As a result, demutualized
exchanges are able to compensate their underperformance in ¢EFF in the CRS-
case and reach an overall productivity that converges with that of the mutuals'
average performance. In the VRS-case however, the higher technological progress
is not su±cient to recoup the underperformance in ¢EFF. As a consequence, the
resulting aggregate e®ect for productivity growth is here on average lower vis-µ a-vis
the mutuals' performance (column ¯ve).
The LISTED-variable, which indicates the additional e®ects of an outsider-
owned governance structure on productivity remains largely negligible. The only
noticeable signi¯cance can be observed in columns four and seven. Here, due to a
signi¯cantly positive sign, we ¯nd evidence that the observed pattern of demutual-
ized exchanges, i.e. a higher technological progress, is more pronounced for publicly
listed exchanges.
In°uence of competition, ¯nancial °exibility, e±ciency The impact of vari-
ables representing the competitive environment on exchange productivity is mostly
insigni¯cant. Our variable representing the ¯nancial °exibility of an exchange,
i.e. ¢LT FINANCE, displays no signi¯cant result except for a negative relation
with technological progress (column four and seven). The control variable EFF
shows that productivity indeed is lower for exchanges that possess higher e±ciency
values (columns two and ¯ve). Thus, productivity gains are easier to accomplish
for exchanges with lower e±ciency values.
Although some interesting points could be derived from our results so far, we
want to emphasize that the discussed variables were primarily introduced as control
variables. Our main focus aims on the in°uence of our business model variables,
which will be discussed in the following.
In°uence of business models From our OUTSOURCING variable we infer
that outsourcing signi¯cantly reduces overall productivity (columns two and ¯ve).
Focusing on the sources of this underperformance we observe that the reduction
stems primarily from the negative e®ect on improvements in technical e±ciency
(columns three and six), which cannot be recouped by the signi¯cantly positive e®ect
of outsourcing on the technological progress (columns four and seven). However,
our Tobit regressions in appendix D indicate that outsourcing has a positive e®ect
on the e±ciency of exchanges. Depending on the assumed technology, the e®ect
lies between 7.4 and 13.4 percentage points. Thus, as productivity growth of these
exchanges is lower we conclude that it is more di±cult for these exchanges to improve
20e±ciency by the same amount as less e±cient exchanges.
Our business model variables indicate that the integration of related activities
does not enhance productivity. In the contrary, our variables V ERTICAL and
HORI ¡V ERTICAL indicate that these forms of integration lead to signi¯cantly
lower overall productivity compared to cash market-only operators. While vertically
integrated exchanges - depending on the considered technological setting - are on
average 44.7 to 45.7 percentage points less productive than cash market-only opera-
tors (columns two and ¯ve), the underperformance is less pronounced for exchanges
that are both horizontally and vertically integrated. Here, we calculate a lower pro-
ductivity of 24.3 and 33.1 percentage points as opposed to cash market operators
(columns two and ¯ve). In both cases, lower improvements in technical e±ciency
(¢EFF) are responsible for the overall lower productivity growth (columns three
and six). At ¯rst glance, horizontally integrated exchanges at least do not seem to
be less productive than cash market exchanges as their overall productivity is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (columns two and ¯ve for the HORIZONTAL-
variable). However, the negative signs of the overall productivity in columns two
and ¯ve suggest that this business model could be inferior in overall productivity
growth. This is con¯rmed by our robustness checks which show that the coe±-
cients turn signi¯cantly negative.39 As before, the main reason lies in the lower
¢EFF-values, which remains on average between 20.6 and 32.1 percentage points
below the values of cash market operators (columns three and six). Exchanges that
provide all of the considered additional activities under one roof and which are sub-
sumed by the FULL INTEGRATION-variable also display a weakly signi¯cant
underperformance by 16.4 percentage points in the CRS-case (column two) and no
signi¯cantly di®erent performance in the VRS-setting (column ¯ve). In contrast to
our HORIZONTAL-variable, however, our robustness checks indicate here that
the ¯nding of a signi¯cantly negative performance in the CRS-case cannot be sup-
ported in alternative regressions and in our bootstrap estimation. This leads us to
the conclusion that fully integrated exchanges do not seem to be signi¯cantly less
productive than cash market-only venues.
Our Tobit-regressions on the e±ciency of these business models mostly con¯rm
our ¯ndings on productivity growth. As indicated in appendix D, none of these
setups is signi¯cantly more e±cient than cash market-only operators while there
is some evidence that exchanges with both derivatives and post-trading (i.e. the
HORI ¡ V ERTICAL-case) are even less e±cient in the VRS-case.
Interpreting the results of the business model variables The results from
the business model variables indicate that a combination of activities is not nec-
essarily productivity-enhancing. In the contrary, exchanges that merely focus on
cash-markets seem to perform superior in productivity growth vis-µ a-vis some other
setups. A possible reason why for example the additional provision of derivatives
trading creates technical ine±ciencies could be related to the inability of the ex-
changes to combine this activity with their existing cash market operations in a
39Refer to our discussion on robustness checks in the next but one paragraph.
21resource saving manner. As the Economist noted in a recent issue, most exchanges
o®ering cash and derivatives trading have not yet consolidated these services onto
a single platform.40 Instead, the exchanges usually provide cash and derivatives
trading on two separate platforms, which adds to the complexity of the business
process on the one hand, and which on the other hand does not take advantage of
potential scope economies. An analogous reasoning can be established for vertically
integrated exchanges. Since institutions that combine cash trading and post-trading
activities also perform poorly in their ability to improve technical e±ciency we con-
clude that potential bene¯ts from combining these activities on productivity are
outweighed by the increased complexity resulting thereof to manage the operations
e±ciently. Our ¯ndings, however, do not give conclusive evidence whether these
forms of integration are indeed ine±cient. For that purpose, we would need to mea-
sure e±ciency according to the second methodological approach, as was indicated in
¯gure 4. Furthermore, we do not imply that (pro¯t-oriented) exchanges should not
diversify into related businesses as the integration may still be a pro¯table invest-
ment for them. Finally, it may also be possible that diversi¯cation strategies are
more driven by risk reduction motives than by the exploitation of potential scope
economies.41
It comes a little surprising that the most complex business model does not seem
to su®er too much from its complexity as it displays a productivity growth that is
comparable to that of cash market-only operators. Since the distinction between this
business model and the others lies in the exchanges' provision of software services, we
suggest that this activity could be a critical driver for e±cient integration strategies.
It seems that strong IT-competence in the form of an in-house software development
and sales division plays a pivotal role for exchanges with multiple business lines
as most transaction activities are nowadays IT-based. It facilitates an e±cient
interconnection and organization of the di®erent transaction platforms within the
institution. Furthermore, economies of scale might be realizable when the (¯xed)
development costs of transaction software are spread over more than one platform.42
Robustness of ¯ndings To check the robustness of our results, in particular
of our ¯ndings on the business model variables, we conducted several robustness
checks. On the one hand, we changed the composition of our regression model
in several ways to verify if this has any signi¯cant impact on our business model
variables. On the other hand, we veri¯ed the validity of our inference by using
bootstrapped standard errors for our regressions.43 In appendix E we present tables
40Confer Economist (2005).
41In the extreme, this policy may not even be in the interest of the exchange but rather of
risk-averse managers as described by Amihud and Lev (1981) for conglomerates in general.
42A software programmer, who works with the Deutsche BÄ orse, indicated that the company's
transaction software for cash trading (XETRA) and derivatives trading (EUREX) base on com-
parable programming algorithms which would con¯rm the notion of potential economies of scale
in software development.
43In particular, we replicated a random drawing with replacement from our sample 2000 times in
order to derive a frequency distribution of coe±cient estimates that allows us to estimate a sample-
speci¯c standard error. Furthermore, we constructed 85%, 90% and 95%-con¯dence intervals by
using the 2.5%, 5%, 7.5% and the 92.5%, 95%, 97.5% percentiles of the distribution, respectively.
We also controlled for our panel data structure by using clusters. Confer Bradley and Tibshirani
228 and 9 that indicate the results of alternations to our model. Tables 8.1 and 8.2
display the impact on the business model variables when the variables describing
the ¯nancial background and governance as well as the competitive situation of
an exchange are omitted, respectively. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show regressions where
competition-variables are substituted by other variables from the same ¯eld. Our
alternations focus primarily on competition variables since here we have the least
certainty about the appropriateness of the employed variables. To be more precise,
in table 9.1 we replace the ¢TRADING-variable by the same variable with a
one-year lag in order to provide more reaction time for the management to act on
changing market circumstances. Table 9.2 displays the results when substituting the
¢TRADING-variable by a ¢LIQUIDITY -variable, which provides information
on the y-o-y change in liquidity subtracted by the median liquidity change of the
whole sample. Finally, table 10 shows our regression results when utilizing the
bootstrap method.
Overall, we ¯nd that the variables' coe±cients from our original regression model
are quite robust. There are very few changes in the coe±cients' signs and all of those
occur for coe±cients that have been insigni¯cant in the original regression or turn
insigni¯cant during the robustness check. Two points are worth mentioning as
they in°uenced our perception of their overall productivity performance. First, the
HORIZONTAL-variable turned signi¯cantly negative in tables 8.2, 9.1, and in our
bootstrapped regressions (table 10). Second, the FULL INTEGRATION-variable
turns insigni¯cant in tables 8.1, 9.2 and in the bootstrapped regressions of table 10.
Therefore, we consider the former variable's coe±cient as likely to be signi¯cantly
negative whereas the latter variable's coe±cient is likely to be insigni¯cant.
4 Conclusion
This paper discussed the ongoing trend of business diversi¯cation within the stock
exchange industry for the years 1999 to 2003 and sought to measure potential dif-
ferences in productivity growth that are attributable to di®ering business models.
We noticed that most of the integration activity in these years was conducted by
pro¯t-oriented, demutualized exchanges, whereas mutual exchanges largely focused
on their existing operations, save for a few entities that diversi¯ed into deriva-
tives trading activities. We presume that the reason for these di®erent patterns lie
in the diverging ownership structures and the resulting objective functions of the
exchanges. While pro¯t-oriented, particularly publicly listed stock exchanges, sub-
stantially rely on revenues from related business activities such as post-trading ser-
vices, derivatives trading or software sales, we ¯nd no evidence that the integration
of these activities also leads to better results in e±ciency and productivity com-
pared to exchanges that focus on cash market operations. Although some potential
for e±ciency improvements should be possible due to economies of scope between
certain activities, this cannot be observed. Counterproductive e®ects such as in-
creased business process complexity seem to dominate the overall e®ect on e±ciency
(1993) for an elaborate discussion on bootstrapping.
23and productivity leading to a worse performance as opposed to cash market-only
operators. Interestingly, exchanges that combine derivatives trading, post-trading
and software sales do not seem to fare worse. Here, the complexity of the di®er-
ent (usually IT-based) business processes are apparently better managed, resulting
in productivity growth that can match that of the cash market-focused providers.
Although we present a rationale why this could be related to its in-house com-
petence in software development, future research is necessary to develop a deeper
understanding for the relevance of IT-competence in the stock exchange industry.
Our analysis exclusively focused on the relative e±ciency and productivity of
exchanges with and without related activities. This analysis therefore also touches
the much discussed topic whether vertical integration is bene¯cial or detrimental
to social welfare. As indicated in the introduction, a signi¯cant outperformance
of a vertically integrated business model would have provided proponents of this
business model a plausible justi¯cation. However, we ¯nd no evidence for such
a phenomenon. Yet, our analysis falls short of providing evidence that vertical
integration is indeed less e±cient, as it remains to be analyzed how these exchanges
perform relative to two entities providing cash trading and post-trading, separately.
24A Descriptive Statistics
Operational Variables
INPUTS x1 x2
Sta® Tangible Assets
(No. Employed) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 558.5 494.4 52,131 74,936
2000 591.0 503.3 58,622 85,873
2001 615.0 529.7 69,657 94,969
2002 682.3 720.6 74,925 104,044
2003 658.1 696.8 79,959 107,562
OUTPUTS y1 y2 y3 y4
Listing Cash Trading Derivatives Trading Settlement/Software
(No. of companies) (Volume in $ 000 000) (No. of contracts in 000) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 858.1 1071.1 1,432,736 2,629,916 26,430 76,181 20,228 45,169
2000 876.3 1056.7 1,942,741 4,208,753 33,024 89,092 27,044 56,448
2001 817.5 924.7 1,359,079 2,842,350 47,298 124,285 31,500 65,918
2002 797.9 868.3 1,248,960 2,446,333 63,260 174,780 46,235 111,907
2003 901.2 1007.3 1,219,142 2,321,408 74,936 198,740 66,019 179,856
Resulting Dependent Variables for the Second Stage
MQ (CRS) ¢EFF (CRS) ¢TECH (CRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.067 0.263 1.088 0.293 0.761 0.273
2000-2001 1.021 0.288 1.034 0.295 0.992 0.079
2001-2002 0.994 0.188 0.967 0.222 1.049 0.168
2002-2003 1.141 0.259 0.938 0.261 1.248 0.203
MQ (VRS) ¢EFF (VRS) ¢TECH (VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.086 0.240 1.105 0.271 0.997 0.138
2000-2001 1.009 0.241 1.104 0.343 0.992 0.079
2001-2002 0.998 0.123 0.993 0.187 1.049 0.168
2002-2003 1.077 0.213 0.893 0.191 1.248 0.203
Independent Framework Variables of the Second Stage
DEMUT LISTED OUTSOURCING
Sum Sum Sum
1999 6 2 5
2000 11 5 7
2001 15 8 7
2002 17 9 8
2003 17 9 7
HORIZONTAL VERTICAL HORI-VERTICAL FULL INTEGRATION
Sum Sum Sum Sum
1999 10 5 5 1
2000 7 6 5 3
2001 6 5 7 4
2002 6 4 6 6
2003 8 5 7 5
FOREIGN LISTING LIQUIDITY
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 0.026 0.046 0.680 0.535
2000 0.031 0.071 1.038 1.103
2001 0.028 0.058 0.812 0.746
2002 0.028 0.059 0.881 0.772
2003 0.013 0.021 0.699 0.518
¢ LT FINANCE ¢ TRADING
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 0.165 0.271 0.030 0.515
2000-2001 0.286 0.392 -0.006 0.292
2001-2002 0.095 0.240 0.035 0.275
2002-2003 0.079 0.273 0.101 0.388
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Employed First and Second Stage Variables
25B First Stage Results
Constant-Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Prod. Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.64 0.72 1.00 0.79 0.81 1.23
NYSE 0.45 0.49 0.66 0.60 0.49 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.95
Toronto TSX 0.74 0.79 0.53 0.72 1.00 0.97 0.71 1.43 1.80
Lima 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.05
BOVESPA 0.34 0.50 0.61 0.89 1.00 1.44 1.37 1.23 1.32
Hellenic 0.55 1.00 0.45 0.28 0.35 1.68 0.44 0.78 1.69
Budapest 0.23 0.24 0.47 0.48 0.66 1.10 1.86 0.65 1.50
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.64
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.11 1.06 0.92 0.74 1.07
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.41 0.88 0.83 0.89 0.73
London 0.83 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.00 1.01
Malta 0.41 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.69 0.82 1.22 1.09
Oslo 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.50 0.37 1.01 0.96 0.69 0.97
OM Gruppen 0.91 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.67 0.98 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.69 1.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.59 0.84 1.08 1.08
Vienna 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.44 0.26 0.98 0.97 1.25 1.01
Warsaw 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.92 0.80 0.96 1.07
Australian 0.90 0.93 0.82 0.85 0.65 1.01 0.94 1.13 1.12
Hongkong 0.42 0.76 0.70 0.54 0.45 1.79 0.88 1.02 1.14
Jakarta 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.69 0.91 1.05 1.15 1.28
Kuala Lumpur 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.92 1.16 0.69 1.26
Philippine 0.45 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.26 1.07 0.95 0.99 1.04
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.57 0.66 0.50 0.26 0.58 1.08 1.06 0.69
Taiwan 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.24 1.10 1.07 1.16 1.04
Thailand 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.95
Tokyo 0.50 0.64 0.90 0.84 0.81 1.08 1.51 1.12 1.22
Mean 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.59 1.07 1.02 0.99 1.14
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.26
Variable-Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Prod. Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.90 0.94 1.00
NYSE 0.57 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.49 1.31 0.93 0.97 0.98
Toronto TSX 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.52
Lima 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.03
BOVESPA 0.36 0.53 0.64 0.94 1.00 1.41 1.26 1.22 1.25
Hellenic 0.67 1.00 0.45 0.28 0.37 1.51 0.45 0.75 1.66
Budapest 0.44 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.32 1.24 1.00 1.01
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.37
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.13 1.09 0.84 0.74 0.97
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.54
London 0.85 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.00
Malta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.98
Oslo 0.83 0.76 0.73 0.54 0.51 0.95 0.96 0.73 1.05
OM Gruppen 0.92 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.66 0.98 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.70 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.54 0.85 1.08 1.08
Vienna 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.68 0.63 1.00 0.95 1.16 1.02
Warsaw 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.92 0.81 1.00 1.12
Australian 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.04 0.98 1.04 1.07
Hongkong 0.43 0.76 0.71 0.59 0.46 1.78 0.88 1.04 1.15
Jakarta 0.35 0.32 0.72 0.82 0.69 0.91 1.37 1.15 1.26
Kuala Lumpur 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.92 1.14 0.78 1.23
Philippine 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.42 1.04 0.96 1.00 1.02
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.58 0.66 0.50 0.27 0.59 1.08 1.06 0.70
Taiwan 0.26 0.33 0.46 0.49 0.25 1.15 1.04 1.16 1.04
Thailand 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.32 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.96
Tokyo 0.51 0.64 0.93 1.00 0.81 1.08 1.46 1.11 1.12
Mean 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.67 1.09 1.01 1.00 1.08
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.21
Table 5: First Stage Results
26C Correlation Matrix
1st and 2nd Stage Variables x
1 x
2 y
1 y
2 y
3 y
4
HORIZONTAL -0.242 -0.285 -0.320 -0.215 0.079 -0.099
VERTICAL -0.249 -0.262 -0.241 -0.182 -0.149 -0.145
HORI-VERTICAL 0.127 0.001 0.025 -0.153 -0.098 0.050
FULL INTEGRATION 0.482 0.225 0.105 0.042 0.471 0.620
OUTSOURCING -0.382 -0.183 -0.176 -0.086 -0.186 -0.207
DEMUT 0.188 0.109 0.074 -0.022 0.221 0.351
LISTED 0.386 0.116 0.041 -0.058 0.299 0.494
LIQUIDITY 0.403 0.439 0.531 0.597 0.193 0.187
¢TRADING 0.035 -0.062 0.035 -0.038 -0.071 -0.075
FOREIGN LISTING 0.403 0.670 0.749 0.892 0.020 -0.013
¢LT FINANCE 0.069 -0.048 0.063 0.071 0.197 0.119
EFF (CRS) 0.266 0.167 0.347 0.313 0.358 0.333
EFF (VRS) 0.162 0.157 0.304 0.313 0.289 0.250
Table 6: Correlation matrix for ¯rst and second stage variables
D Tobit Regressions on E±ciency
Technology
CRS VRS
HORIZONTAL -0.059 -0.087
Std. Err. 0.066 0.092
VERTICAL 0.017 0.103
Std. Err. 0.084 0.084
HORI-VERTICAL -0.064 -0.163*
Std. Err. 0.070 0.087
FULL INTEGRATION -0.043 -0.107
Std. Err. 0.084 0.106
OUTSOURCING 0:074y 0.134*
Std. Err. 0.052 0.077
DEMUT 0.125*** 0.166***
Std. Err. 0.044 0.062
LIQUIDITY 0.010 0.033
Std. Err. 0.026 0.038
¢TRADING 0.000 0.049
Std. Err. 0.045 0.046
FOREIGN LISTING 1.805*** 3.327***
Std. Err. 0.425 0.717
¢LT FINANCE -0.007 -0.008
Std. Err. 0.033 0.040
CONST 0.584*** 0.698***
Std. Err. 0.069 0.100
Observations 140 140
Wald Â2 51.18 62.85
Table 7: Results from Tobit-regressions on e±ciency values (random e®ects model)
27E Robustness Checks
Regressions without governance variables
Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
8.1 MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL -0.197 -0.289*** 0.095 -0.070 -0.182*** 0.102
Std. Err. 0.153 0.112 0.071 0.117 0.048 0.111
VERTICAL -0.441*** -0.524*** 0.086 -0.426*** -0.366*** -0.046
Std. Err. 0.113 0.112 0.109 0.107 0.092 0.083
HORI-VERTICAL -0.329*** -0.363*** 0.045 -0.226*** -0.207*** -0.041
Std. Err. 0.102 0.056 0.115 0.055 0.043 0.085
FULL INTEGRATION -0.160 -0.366*** 0:183y -0.041 -0.235** 0.154
Std. Err. 0.129 0.021 0.116 0.088 0.106 0.167
OUTSOURCING -0.237*** -0.443*** 0.229*** -0.274*** -0.411*** 0.186**
Std. Err. 0.045 0.017 0.057 0.104 0.058 0.083
LIQUIDITY -0.017 -0.001 -0.028 -0.014 0.059 -0.053
Std. Err. 0.024 0.046 0.054 0.024 0.066 0.093
¢TRADING 0.020 -0.022 0.052 0.054* 0.015 0.063
Std. Err. 0.029 0.027 0.050 0.031 0.073 0.078
FOREIGN LISTING 0.661 -0.093 0.859 -0.233 0.196 -0.517
Std. Err. 0.603 0.835 0.695 0.515 0.752 1.120
¢LT FINANCE -0.060 0:091y -0.166*** -0.032 0.106*** -0.151*
Std. Err. 0.098 0.062 0.032 0.095 0.031 0.090
EFF -0.996*** -1.047*** 0.058 -0.577*** -1.058*** 0.410***
Std. Err. 0.310 0.314 0.126 0.197 0.272 0.155
CONST 1.957*** 2.046*** 0.931*** 1.698*** 2.009*** 0.756***
Std. Err. 0.167 0.152 0.068 0.122 0.211 0.128
Regressions without ¯nancial °exibility and competition variables
8.2 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL ¡0:217y -0.325*** 0.121* -0.088 -0.191*** 0.096
Std. Err. 0.135 0.105 0.069 0.132 0.054 0.113
VERTICAL -0.502*** -0.475*** -0.024 -0.486*** -0.302*** -0.184**
Std. Err. 0.108 0.126 0.052 0.093 0.126 0.083
HORI-VERTICAL -0.349*** -0.381*** 0.048 -0.230*** -0.204*** -0.042
Std. Err. 0.085 0.054 0.098 0.047 0.030 0.092
FULL INTEGRATION -0.204*** -0.297*** 0.069 -0.056 -0.144 0.052
Std. Err. 0.053 0.081 0.101 0.049 0.148 0.142
OUTSOURCING -0.230*** -0.427*** 0.223*** -0.303** -0.412*** 0.149***
Std. Err. 0.076 0.048 0.047 0.133 0.081 0.058
DEMUT -0.013 -0.165*** 0.173*** -0.079* -0.130*** 0.056***
Std. Err. 0.051 0.020 0.060 0.041 0.031 0.021
LISTED 0.021 -0.055 0.062** 0.076 -0.051 0.140*
Std. Err. 0.139 0.117 0.027 0.139 0.110 0.077
EFF -0.988*** -0.963*** -0.028 -0.565*** -0.969*** 0.328**
Std. Err. 0.252 0.250 0.047 0.201 0.304 0.161
CONST 1.972*** 2.079*** 0.901*** 1.711*** 2.064*** 0.728***
Std. Err. 0.132 0.122 0.012 0.094 0.232 0.151
Table 8: Robustness check by omitting variables
28Regressions with di®erent competition variables
9.1 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
¢TRADINGt¡1 for t (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL ¡0:191y -0.340*** 0.182* -0.133 -0.297*** 0.162
Std. Err. 0.131 0.095 0.101 0.122 0.065 0.164
VERTICAL -0.445*** -0.518*** 0.120 -0.553*** -0.513*** -0.032
Std. Err. 0.064 0.078 0.120 0.089 0.126 0.165
HORI-VERTICAL -0.323*** -0.399*** 0.108 -0.259*** -0.280*** 0.008
Std. Err. 0.098 0.049 0.139 0.071 0.070 0.126
FULL INTEGRATION ¡0:151y -0.328*** 0.187 -0.099 ¡0:314y 0.184
Std. Err. 0.105 0.063 0.136 0.089 0.220 0.26
OUTSOURCING -0.246*** -0.416*** 0.196*** -0.314*** -0.417*** 0.142**
Std. Err. 0.078 0.052 0.033 0.125 0.048 0.064
DEMUT -0.009 -0.187*** 0.205** -0.102* -0.129* 0.028**
Std. Err. 0.042 0.052 0.089 0.058 0.068 0.012
LISTED 0.013 -0.059 0.065* 0.046 -0.077 0.134*
Std. Err. 0.132 0.100 0.035 0.134 0.107 0.078
LIQUIDITY ¡0:026y 0.029 -0.079* -0.014 0.095** -0.100
Std. Err. 0.016 0.041 0.042 0.026 0.044 0.073
¢TRADING 0.002 -0.009 0.035 -0.064*** -0.117** 0.053
Std. Err. 0.031 0.032 0.028 0.023 0.051 0.048
FOREIGN LISTING 0.684 -0.876 1.763* -0.385 -0.218 -0.195
Std. Err. 0.653 1.017 1.016 0.814 0.401 0.989
¢LT FINANCE -0.058 0.011 -0.077** -0.040 0.065 ¡0:113y
Std. Err. 0.07 0.081 0.037 0.081 0.057 0.077
EFF -0.997*** -0.908*** -0.110 -0.508** -0.948*** 0.367***
Std. Err. 0.294 0.349 0.151 0.229 0.309 0.151
CONST 1.964*** 2.070*** 0.903*** 1.756*** 2.077*** 0.750***
Std. Err. 0.169 0.153 0.011 0.125 0.236 0.152
9.2 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
¢LIQUIDITY for ¢TRADING (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL -0.211 -0.351*** 0.162* -0.092 -0.200*** 0.107
Std. Err. 0.163 0.134 0.086 0.133 0.062 0.124
VERTICAL -0.476*** -0.530*** 0.079 -0.472*** -0.343*** -0.121
Std. Err. 0.13 0.135 0.083 0.136 0.123 0.095
HORI-VERTICAL -0.338*** -0.408*** 0.096 -0.232*** -0.218*** -0.026
Std. Err. 0.114 0.075 0.131 0.073 0.034 0.103
FULL INTEGRATION -0.153 -0.319*** 0:151y -0.033 -0.192 0.127
Std. Err. 0.115 0.068 0.105 0.109 0.166 0.206
OUTSOURCING -0.256*** -0.424*** 0.194*** -0.311** -0.397*** 0.126**
Std. Err. 0.073 0.053 0.040 0.146 0.087 0.065
DEMUT -0.011 -0.189*** 0.204** -0.098** -0.125** 0.028**
Std. Err. 0.039 0.051 0.090 0.049 0.056 0.013
LISTED 0.019 -0.049 0:051y 0.070 -0.043 0:122y
Std. Err. 0.127 0.101 0.032 0.136 0.123 0.078
LIQUIDITY -0.080** -0.023 -0.049 -0.059* 0.078* -0.122*
Std. Err. 0.038 0.042 0.038 0.037 0.041 0.074
¢LIQUIDITY -0.076** ¡0:070y 0.029 ¡0:038y 0.020 -0.050***
Std. Err. 0.039 0.048 0.027 0.026 0.018 0.02
FOREIGN LISTING 0.866 -0.707 1.694* -0.278 -0.304 -0.027
Std. Err. 0.637 0.963 0.996 0.842 0.454 1.093
¢LT FINANCE -0.062 0.007 -0.075** -0.042 0.060 -0.111
Std. Err. 0.072 0.083 0.037 0.083 0.071 0.083
EFF -0.969*** -0.886*** -0.105 -0.534** -0.981*** 0.375**
Std. Err. 0.316 0.358 0.141 0.233 0.323 0.161
CONST 2.007*** 2.106*** 0.900*** 1.763*** 2.014*** 0.812***
Std. Err. 0.140 0.132 0.011 0.123 0.227 0.124
Table 9: Robustness check with varying competition variables
29Regression with Bootstrapping (2000 Replications, 5%, 10% and 15%-Level)
Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
Bootstrapping (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL -0.199** -0.321** 0.132 ¡0:098y -0.206 0.098
Std. Err. 0.135 0.143 0.176 0.123 0.225 0.172
VERTICAL ¡0:447y -0.507** 0.072 ¡0:457y ¡0:348y -0.101
Std. Err. 0.417 0.290 0.220 0.393 0.323 0.174
HORI-VERTICAL -0.331** -0.381** 0.065 -0.243** -0.222 -0.043
Std. Err. 0.203 0.163 0.201 0.184 0.235 0.185
FULL INTEGRATION -0.164 -0.300** 0.115 -0.058 -0.194 0.092
Std. Err. 0.162 0.162 0.176 0.163 0.228 0.198
OUTSOURCING -0.239** -0.427** 0.213* ¡0:290y -0.399** 0.155*
Std. Err. 0.154 0.154 0.132 0.227 0.207 0.120
DEMUT -0.007 -0.190** 0.210** -0.093* -0.124** 0.035
Std. Err. 0.092 0.080 0.050 0.073 0.079 0.051
LISTED 0.011 -0.055 0.051 0.064 -0.041 0.115*
Std. Err. 0.174 0.149 0.070 0.179 0.132 0.083
LIQUIDITY -0.017 0.011 -0.041 -0.012 0.065 -0.057
Std. Err. 0.117 0.114 0.081 0.072 0.095 0.084
¢TRADING 0.019 -0.036 0.067* 0.046 0.003 0.066
Std. Err. 0.067 0.066 0.057 0.057 0.092 0.076
FOREIGN LISTING 0.649 -0.810 1.641** -0.468 -0.247 -0.285
Std. Err. 1.012 0.923 0.951 0.915 0.949 0.933
¢LT FINANCE -0.06 0.015 ¡0:084y -0.047 0.060 -0.117**
Std. Err. 0.122 0.098 0.065 0.068 0.064 0.060
EFF -0.993** -0.917** -0.085 -0.531** -0.984** 0.379**
Std. Err. 0.254 0.228 0.120 0.176 0.171 0.164
CONST 1.958** 2.079** 0.894** 1.721** 2.030** 0.757**
Std. Err. 0.224 0.200 0.177 0.193 0.204 0.168
Table 10: Bootstrap test
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